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Abstract 
  Statistical discrimination occurs when distinctions between demographic groups are 
made on the basis of real or imagined statistical distinctions between the groups.  While such 
discrimination is legal in some cases (e.g., insurance markets), it is illegal and/or controversial in 
others (e.g., racial profiling and gender-based labor market discrimination).  “First-moment” 
statistical discrimination occurs when, for example, female workers are offered lower wages 
because females are perceived to be less productive, on average, than male workers.  “Second-
moment” discrimination would occur when risk-averse employers offer female workers lower 
wages based not on lower average productivity but on a higher variance in their productivity.  
Empirical work on statistical discrimination is hampered by the difficulty of obtaining suitable 
data from naturally-occurring markets.  This paper reports results from controlled laboratory 
experiments designed to study second-moment statistical discrimination in a labor market 
setting.  Since decision-makers may not view risk in the same way as economists or statisticians 
(i.e., risk=variance of distribution), we also examine two possible alternative measures of risk:  
the support of the distribution, and the probability of earning less than the expected (maximum) 
profits for the employer.  Our results indicate that individuals do respond to these alternative 
measures of risk, and employers made statistically discriminatory wage offers consistent with 
loss-aversion in our full sample (though differences between male and female employers can be 
noted).  If one can transfer these results outside of the laboratory, they indicate that 
discrimination estimates based only on first-moment discrimination are biased.  The public 
policy implication is that efforts and legislation aimed at reducing discrimination of various sorts 
face an additional challenge in trying to identify and limit relatively hidden, but significant, 
forms of statistical discrimination. 
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  When membership in a particular group conveys valuable information about an 
individual’s skills, productivity, or other characteristics, an agent with no personal prejudice may 
still find it rational to statistically discriminate.  Examples of statistical discrimination appear in a 
variety of settings such as wage or hiring decisions in labor markets, racial profiling in law 
enforcement, determinants of loan approval rates, voting the party ticket in elections, differential 
premiums for insurance, or even choosing friends or new church members.  In some settings, 
statistical discrimination is legal and acceptable (e.g., insurance rates), whereas in other settings 
it is controversial and/or illegal (e.g., racial profiling and employment discrimination).  Existing 
research on statistical discrimination has focused on first-moment statistical discrimination.  That 
is, discriminatory wage offers to females or lower loan approval rates for individuals from 
minority racial groups are based on average productivity and default rates, respectively.  Agents 
attribute the average characteristics of the group to each individual from that group when it is 
costly to gather information. 
  In this paper, we explore the possibility that statistical discrimination extends beyond 
differential treatment based on average group characteristics.  Specifically, discrimination may 
also exist if agents base decisions on the risk of the distribution of group productivity (or default 
rates, accident rates, etc.).  Using labor markets as an example, employers may make lower wage 
offers to females based on a higher productivity variance, even though average productivity may 
be identical to male employee productivity.  If such variance-based statistical discrimination is 
empirically documented, then existing measures of statistical discrimination are biased and 
measures of prejudiced-based discrimination may be over-stated.  In other words, some 
discrimination labeled as personal prejudice or taste-based may really be just a different form of 




  We report results from a controlled laboratory experiment in which subjects are engaged 
as employers and workers in a laboratory double-auction labor market.  We choose a labor 
market context for the laboratory environment because many existing empirical studies of 
statistical discrimination examine labor markets.  However, the insights we gain extend to other 
contexts.  Four labor productivity distribution treatments are examined.  In a given treatment, all 
workers belong to the labor pool and labor productivity is determined by an ex post random draw 
with probabilities based on the common knowledge productivity distribution.  The productivity 
distribution of the labor pool differs across treatments, but average productivity is constant 
across all treatments.  We find that subject-employers make significantly different wage offers as 
a result of various measures of risk that do not alter the average productivity of workers.  The 
possibility of less-than-expected (i.e., average) profits, in particular, lowers the wage contract 
made by the average employer.  The implication of our results is that statistical discrimination 
may be more pervasive than previously thought. 
 
Statistical Discrimination 
Statistical theories of discrimination have been advanced by Arrow (1972), Phelps 
(1972), Aigner and Cain (1977), and Lundberg and Startz (1983).  Some studies base statistical 
discrimination on noisier productivity signals for certain worker groups, while others base it on 
imperfect or incomplete information.  Lang (1986) argues that statistical discrimination can be 
caused also by a differential cost of communication with different groups—the minority group 
would bear the cost of the communication.  In a somewhat similar vein, Cornell and Welch 
(1996) argue that statistical discrimination can result from a filtering situation in which 




employer’s, thus creating “screening” discrimination.  Most researchers advance theories that 
depend on differences in average productivity characteristics, although others note that statistical 
discrimination need not be based on differences in average productivity (e.g., Aigner and Cain, 
1977; Curley and Yates, 1985; the latter considers that the range of a probability distribution 
affects individual preferences).  For risk-averse individuals, it seems clear that a less-risky 
outcome distribution would be preferred to a more risky distribution, although the riskiness of an 
outcome distribution may be defined in several different ways. 
  Empirical evidence alluding to statistical discrimination can be found in a variety of 
settings, though it is often difficult to identify taste-based versus statistical discrimination (see 
discussion in Arrow, 1998).  Probably the only easily observable forms of statistical 
discrimination are the legal forms, such as those found in the insurance industry.  In labor 
markets, observable marginal productivity is required to correctly identify statistical 
discrimination.  There is some direct evidence from employer interviews that race is used as a 
proxy in employment decisions (Wilson, 1996).  Neumark (1999) uses field data to show that 
discrimination not based on productivity characteristics is observed, and it is attributed to poorer 
information about the discriminated-against group.  In contrast, Altonji and Pierret (2001) utilize 
an econometric technique designed to identify statistical discrimination, and find little evidence 
for statistical discrimination based on race.   
In credit markets it is illegal for lenders to discriminate against borrowers of a protected 
class, even if class turned out to be a good proxy for unobservable risk factors.  Ladd (1998) 
reports evidence consistent with at least some amount of statistical discrimination in mortgage 
lending.  Ayres and Siegelman (1995) and Goldberg (1996) use an audit study approach to 




discrimination, the argument being that dealers may infer different reservation values on 
individuals buyers based on their race or gender.  Similarly, List (2004) examines statistical 
discrimination in sports cards markets and finds that statistical discrimination explains observed 
differences in negotiations with minorities better than prejudiced-based discrimination.  Race 
also appears to affect law enforcement decisions (Applebaum, 1996), as is noted in the 
discussion in Loury (1998), who also emphasizes the difficulty in attributing causation to such 
race-based decisions.   
  Given some of the identification and causation issues inherent in field data approaches to 
examining discrimination, some have used controlled experiments to examine statistically-based 
discrimination.  Anderson and Haupert (1999) examine statistical discrimination where 
employers must decide whether or not to purchase additional information on workers (i.e., 
statistical discrimination based on imperfect information).  Davis (1987) shows how maximal 
quality selection may imply that groups from which the employer draws fewer observations may 
lead to an inference of lower average productivity.  Thus, statistical discrimination is shown to 
result from an incorrect inference about the productivity distribution of certain groups of 
workers.  Finally, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) examine behavior in simple economic 
experiments and find evidence that (incorrect) ethnic stereotypes—a type of statistical 
discrimination—are responsible for some of the observed patterns in the data.   
  Our paper adopts a laboratory approach to examine more hidden forms of statistical 
discrimination that are often difficult to examine from field data.  Rather than study first-moment 
statistical discrimination, we focus on statistical discrimination that is more difficult to examine 
in the field.  Average worker productivity in our experiment is identical, but what differs across 




research that shows the potential importance on cognitive assessment of risk of not only the 
distributional variance, but also the support of the distribution (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; 
Curley and Yates, 1985; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Babcock et al, 1995) and the potential for 
loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  While others have found field evidence of statistical 
discrimination based on higher-order moments of a distribution (e.g., Ayers and Siegelman, 
1995; Goldberg, 1996; List, 2004), our contribution is that we examine multiple measures of 
distributional risk, not just distributional variance.  Additionally, our approach provides a more 
controlled environment in which to precisely manipulate the productivity distribution of the 
workers.  Though this approach is less externally valid than field experiments or audit studies, 
the trade-off is necessary in order to precisely manipulate the “risk” variable in our design. 
We employ a full information environment to examine the existence of higher-order 
statistical discrimination.  Average worker productivity is identical, causation can only go one 
direction in our design, and the market institution for determining wage contracts is one that 
produces strong convergence to the competitive equilibrium prediction.  Nevertheless, we find 




  We implement a two-sided auction market design to simulate a labor market.  Workers 
are more plentiful than employers and so there is an equilibrium level of “unemployment” in this 
design.  Both supply and demand for labor are induced upon the experimental subjects using 




The baseline design we use is simple in that it generates clear equilibrium predictions.  
Specifically, the demand side of the experimental market consists of 5 employers, each capable 
of hiring one unit of labor in each experimental market round.  The productivity of a unit of labor 
in the baseline (treatment 1) is certain and fixed at 3 units of output (each unit of output sells for 
$1 experimental), and so the demand for labor is perfectly elastic at $3.00 up to 5 units of labor.  
The supply side of the market consists of 10 workers, each with reservation wage of $.50, and 
each able to sell at most one unit of labor services in each experimental market round.  As such, 
the supply curve is perfectly elastic at $.50 up until 10 units of labor.  The predicted market wage 
is $.50, and the predicted market quantity of labor traded is 5 units.  We used the labels 
“worker”, “employer”, and “wages to facilitate the subjects’ understanding of the connection 
between productivity and final payoff, but it was clear to all subjects that no labor task would be 
completed in the experiment.  In this way, we maintain strict control over productivity in the 
experiment.  Figure 1 shows the experimental design graphically. 
  The baseline experimental design is quite similar to that used in Smith (1965), though 
Smith does not use a labor market context.  In our design the employers are not given 
information on worker reservation wages, and workers are not informed as to the value (to 
employers) of a unit of output.  Payoff information is therefore private to each subject as in 
Smith (1965), who shows that, even when market surplus at equilibrium is designed to be 
extremely imbalanced, this trading institution produces strong convergence of equilibrium prices 
to the competitive equilibrium prediction.  Any evidence of statistical discrimination in the 
uncertain productivity treatments would then be significant given the strong competitive 




  The stochastic or uncertain productivity treatments are labeled treatments 2, 3, and 4.  
The difference across these uncertain productivity treatments lies in the particular (known) 
productivity distribution for the labor pool.  After hiring a unit of labor in an uncertain 
productivity treatment the employer discovers the realized productivity of that unit of labor by 
means of an ex post random draw.  Specifically, in treatment 2, productivity of the labor pool is 
either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 units of output with probability 10%, 10%, 60%, 10%, and 10%, 
respectively.  Productivity is determined by a random draw from a Bingo cage, and an 
independent draw is conducted for each employer who hires a unit of labor.  Though wage 
contracts are made with a specific experimental subject in any given trading round, it is made 
clear that productivity draws are independent of the actual worker-subject (i.e., you cannot 
contract in the next round with John Doe to ensure productivity of 5 just because it happened to 
turn out that way in the current or past rounds when contracting with John Doe).  The 
independence of the productivity draw from the specific worker-subject controls for differences 
that employers in naturally-occurring work environments would have in sorting and selecting 
workers from a given labor pool.  We simply assume that employers are equal on this dimension, 
and so hiring any worker from a given pool of workers with a specific productivity distribution is 
similar to taking a random draw from the productivity distribution. 
  Treatments 3 and 4 also involve uncertain productivity distributions of the labor pool, but 
they differ from treatment 2 in terms of the specific distribution.  In treatment 3, productivity of 
the labor pool is either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 units of output with probability 20% for each possible 
outcome.  In treatment 4, productivity of the labor pool is either 2 or 4 units of output with 




The expected competitive employer profit is $2.50 experimental dollars since the 
expected revenue is $3.00 and the competitive wage is $0.50. There were a total of seven 
experimental sessions in which the order of the treatments was randomized. Each of the four 
treatments in an experimental session lasted four periods. There were a total of 35 employers in 
our experiment, and we observe wage contracts for each employer a total of sixteen times.   
Hence, we have a panel with 560 observations.  
Table 1 describes the experimental design in terms of how each of the treatments varies 
with respect to distinct measures of productivity distribution risk.  This design allows us to 
examine several candidate variables for statistical discrimination:  discrimination based on the 
variance of labor productivity, based on the support of the productivity distribution, or based on 
the probability of less-than-expected competitive profits for the employer.  A comparison of 
wage contracts in treatment 1 to treatments 2, 3, and 4 allows us to test these different 
hypotheses of statistical discrimination.  Binary comparisons among treatments 2, 3, and 4 allow 
us to look at the joint effects of varying combinations of variance, support, and probability of 
less-than-expected competitive profits for the employer.  The difference between treatment 3 and 
treatment 2 reflects the joint effects of a higher variance and greater probability of less-than- 
expected profits in treatment 3. The difference between treatment 4 and treatment 2 reflects the 
joint effects of a smaller support and a greater probability of less-than-expected profits in 
treatment 4.  Finally, the difference between treatment 4 and treatment 3 reflects the joint effects 
of a smaller variance, a smaller support, and a greater probability of less-than-expected profits in 
treatment 4.  For the statistical analysis discussed next, we also create independent variables that 






Our results are summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  In Table 2, we use dummy variables to 
control for the uncertainty productivity treatments 2, 3, and 4, and we also include round dummy 
variables for rounds 2, 3, and 4.  The results are random effects estimates, which account for 
differences in wage contracts across employers and possible correlation in the error terms across 
rounds for an individual employer’s wage contracts.  This random effects specification seems a 
reasonable approach to our panel data.  OLS estimation is rejected in favor of fixed effects and 
random effects.  However, given our particular design, the coefficient estimates from the random 
effects specification are identical to those from a fixed effects or an ordinary least squares 
estimation with a single constant term (see Dickinson and Oaxaca, 2005, for details).  The 
random effects and fixed effects estimator for the treatment effects are identical and differ from 
OLS only in the estimated standard errors. 
The Table 2 results show that, for the full sample, treatments 3 and 4 significantly lower 
wage contracts offered to workers, but the results from the gender-specific samples show that 
this is due entirely to the behavior of the male employers.  Male employers offered significantly 
lower wage contracts in each of the 3 uncertain productivity treatments relative to certain 
productivity of workers in treatment 1.  The largest decrease in wage contract occurred in 
treatment 4 for the male sample, in which wage contracts were 21 cents lower than in the certain 
productivity treatment.  This amount is about 32% lower given the average wage contract level 
of about 65 cents.  Female employers, on the other hand, did not offer significantly different 
wages across treatments.  This is consistent with female employers being risk neutral.  Across 
rounds, the estimated coefficients indicate that wage contracts converge towards equilibrium in 




Table 3 presents treatment effects comparisons (i.e., coefficient comparisons) from 
within the uncertain productivity treatments. Treatment 3 versus treatment 2 picks up the 
combined effects of greater variance and greater probability of less-than-expected profits.  These 
combined effects are negative in all samples but statistically significant only for the full sample 
and the female sample.  Treatment 4 versus treatment 2 reflects the combined effect of the 
smaller support but higher probability of less-than-expected profits in treatment 4.  In all samples 
the combined effect is negative and statistically significant.  This reflects the dominance of the 
loss aversion motive.  Treatment 4 versus treatment 3 picks up the joint effect of a lower 
variance, a smaller support, and a higher probability of less-than-expected profits in treatment 4.  
The joint effect was negative in all samples but statistically significant only for the male 
employer sample.  If employers consider expected profits to be a reference point, then less-than-
expected profits may be considered a loss by subjects.  Apparently for males the loss aversion 
motive dominates both of the other measures of lower risk when comparing treatment 4 with 
treatment 3.  
Though these results presented thus far offer some initial evidence of statistical 
discrimination based on distributional risk, it is also the case that the treatment effects 
specification does not strictly control for differences in the productivity distribution’s variance, 
support, or probability of below average profits.  This follows from the fact that certain 
treatments vary more than one of these distributional characteristics (see Table 1).  In 
formulating our statistical design, we had not originally considered the loss aversion factor 
associated with the variation in the probability of less-than expected profits. We therefore also 
estimate a model using explicit controls for individual changes in each of these distributional 




In Table 4 wage contracts are regressed on variables for variance, support, and loss 
probability, where loss probability is measured relative to expected (competitive) profits.  As in 
Table 2, the Table 4 results are from a random effects specification, and results are presented for 
the entire employer sample as well as the gender-based employer sub-samples.
1  Among the risk 
measure variables in Table 4, we can see in the overall sample that the only significant predictor 
of wage contract differences is the probability of loss.  The magnitude of Loss Prob at -.25 
indicates, for example, that wage contracts were 12.5 cents lower in treatment 4 than in treatment 
1 (19% lower given estimated average wage contracts of 65 cents in treatment 1).  As is the case 
in all estimated Table 2 models, Table 4 results shows evidence that outcomes converge towards 
equilibrium in later rounds of each treatment.   
Results for male versus female employer wage contracts again show intriguing 
differences in individual’s response to the incentives of the different productivity distributions.  
Male employers significantly decreased wage contracts when Loss Prob and Support are higher, 
while they increased wage contracts for high Variance treatments.  Together, the magnitude of 
the effects is strongest for those risk factors that cause male subjects to decrease wage contracts 
(p=.08 on the Wald test of equal coefficients on Support and Variance).  On the other hand, 
female employers did not significantly alter wage contracts in response to changes in Loss Prob 
or Variance.  The only significant risk variable in the Female employer sample model, Support, 
implies higher wage contracts to workers with a larger difference between highest and lowest 
possible worker productivity.  This is somewhat puzzling, and may point towards risk preferring 
behavior that is at odds with earlier evidence consistent with risk neutrality among female 
employers.  The result is also consistent with female optimism as to the likely productivity draw 
                                                 
1 As before, the random effects estimates are identical to those from fixed effects or OLS specifications due to our 




from a distribution with larger support.  Recall that this is the opposite of the male subject 
response to changes in Support.  Therefore, if beliefs as well as risk preferences are important 
determinants of wage contracts, there may be systematic differences in both of these across 
genders (e.g., males being either less optimistic, or having risk aversion that dominates any 
optimism towards the likely productivity draw).
2 
Another possible explanation for the gender difference in our results is that female 
employers negotiate worse outcomes (i.e., higher wage contracts) in general.  Existing research 
on gender differences has shown that females are generally less driven by competition and more 
averse to negotiations than males.  In our experiment, employer payoffs are partly determined by 
one’s ability to compete with other employers while negotiating with workers in the double-
sided auction institution.  Babcock and Laschever (2003) document that females are generally 
more averse to negotiations than males.   
Suppose that female subjects in our sample are risk-averse, and expected payoffs are a 
function of the productivity distribution risk as well as negotiations risk.  If employer-worker 
matching is essentially random, then we would expect male employers and workers to have 
better contract outcomes than females.  Female employers would offer higher wages, on average, 
and this would counteract any tendency to lower wages in response to worker productivity 
distribution risk.  We do not, however, find such evidence that female employers offer higher 
wage contracts, ceteris paribus, or that females do worse in mixed-gender negotiations.
3  
Aversion to negotiations may also manifest itself in gender-matching patterns, with female 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dickinson and Oaxaca, 2005). 
2 Though we do not generate data on beliefs, we do not consider optimism to be a likely explanation for our results.  
The reason is that subjects were given very explicit details on the exact productivity distribution. 
3 We conduct a wage regression identical to the full employer sample in Table 4, while including a dummy variable 
for female employer.  The coefficient on this variable is statistically no different from zero (p=.84).  Also, we also 
find statistically insignificant effects of gender-composition dummy variables.  These results are available from the 




employers more likely to contract with a female worker.  In our sample, single-gender 
contracts—male-male or female-female agreements—are statistically significantly more likely 
than mixed-gender contracts (306 to 252 individual wage contracts—p=.01 for the one-sided 
binomial test).  This pattern is also consistent with female aversion to competitive negotiations. 
So, while there is some evidence that females may be more averse to negotiating with 
male subjects, we do not find evidence that women fare worse in mixed-gender pairs or that they 
offer generally higher wage contracts.  In short, the fact that females may be more averse to 
competitive negotiations does not explain the wage results from our gender-specific samples.  
Our experimental data indicate that males react more significantly to distinct measures of the 
productivity risk than females.  Though we cannot fully explain the nature of this result, the 
overall significance is that we find evidence for statistical discrimination that is not based on 
average group differences.  Considering this labor market context, our full data sample show 
evidence that one variable in particular—a higher potential for less-than-average payoffs—can 
significantly decrease the wage that an employer would pay to individuals from the more risky 
labor pool.
4  The context of the statistical discrimination may be important for this result, but it 
implies that individuals respond significantly to increased distributional risk.  If subjects feel 
somehow entitled to earn expected profits then, for the entire sample, the subjects’ statistically 
discriminating behavior is consistent with loss aversion. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper has examined a very simple framework for studying second-moment 
statistical discrimination.  Despite the strong competitive equilibrium convergence properties of 
                                                 
4 This result is due to the single-period framework we utilize.  In a multi-period framework where market 




the double-auction institution, we were able to uncover indications of statistical discrimination, 
mainly among male subjects.  At this point we have no explanation as to why there should be a 
gender difference.  Although we do not report the results here, we also examined whether or not 
the gender composition of the contract pair had any effect. The results showed that gender 
composition of the contract pair had no effect on wage contracts (these results are available on 
request). 
The next step in this line of research is to have two groups of workers with different 
productivity risks compete simultaneously in the market.  This corresponds more naturally to 
field labor market institutions.  We would also consider the implementation of upward sloping 
labor supply curves to add external validity to our design.  Nonetheless, even at this initial stage 
there is an important message emerging from the data.  Statistical discrimination can exist in 
many forms, and only the most obvious forms of statistical discrimination—based on differences 
in average productivity among worker-groups—are likely to be measured in field studies.  Even 
studies that examine distributional variance may not be capturing all the statistical discrimination 
in the data.  Productivity risk from distinct worker-groups should be a concern, and our results 
indicate that current measures of statistical discrimination are predictably biased when this is not 
taken into account.  Specifically, statistical discrimination will be under-estimated when one 
ignores more hidden forms of this type of discrimination.
5  Furthermore, measures of prejudice-
based discrimination may be over-estimated if one fails to account for the likelihood that a 
certain component of unexplained wage differentials is due to a form of statistical discrimination 
not usually considered.  Policy prescriptions aimed at reducing discrimination in various markets 
                                                 
5 This assumes that groups with lower average productivity are the same groups that have riskier distributions.  
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3 0 0  0 
2 1,2,3,4,5 
(.1,.1,.6,.1,.1) 
3 1  1-5  .20 
3 1,2,3,4,5 
(.2,.2,.2,.2,.2) 
3 2  1-5  .40 
4 2,4 
(.5,.5) 





















Random effects estimation 










Variable Coef. (st. error)  Coef. (st. error)  Coef. (st. error) 
Constant  .756 (.036)***  .832 (.059)***  .698 (.045)*** 
T2         -.029 (.029)  -.127 (.041)***           .045 (.041) 
T3  -.078 (.029)***  -.137 (.041)***          -.035 (.041) 
T4  -.115 (.029)***  -.213 (.041)***          -.041 (.041) 
Round 2  -.119 (.029)***  -.116 (.041)***  -.121 (.041)*** 
Round 3  -.143 (.029)***  -.153 (.041)***  -.135 (.041)*** 
Round 4  -.149 (.029)***  -.167 (.041)***  -.135 (.041)*** 
R
2 .067  .115  .055 












Binary Comparisons Among the Uncertain Productivity Treatments 





Full Employer Sample 
(N=560) 
 








Difference (st. error) 
 
Difference (st. error) 
 
Difference (st. error) 
T3-T2  -.049 (.029)*  -.010 (.041)  -.080 (.041)* 
T4-T2  -.086 (.029)***  -.086 (.041)**  -.086 (.041)** 
T4-T3  -.037 (.029)  -.076 (.041)*  -.006 (.041) 










Random Effects Results 





Full Employer Sample 
(N=560) 
coef. (st. error) 
Male Employer Sample 
(N=240) 
coef. (st. error) 
Female Employer Sample 
(N=320) 
coef. (st. error) 
Constant  .756 (.036)***  .832 (.059)***  .698 (.045)*** 
Variance            .001 (.038)             .087 (.052)*             -.064 (.053) 
Support            .053 (.127)            -.294 (.175)*              .313 (.177)* 
Loss Prob  -.252 (.084)***  -.482 (.117)***             -.079 (.118) 
Round 1  -.119 (.029)***  -.116 (.041)***  -.121 (.041)*** 
Round 2  -.143 (.029)***  -.153 (.041)***  -.135 (.041)*** 
Round 3  -.149 (.029)***  -.167 (.041)***  -.135 (.041)*** 
R
2 .067  .115  .055 































  This is an experiment in economic decision-making.  Please read and follow the 
instructions carefully.  Your decisions as well as the decisions of others will help determine your 
total cash payment for participation in this experiment. 
  In this experiment, you are an Employer.  Other individuals in the experiment will be 
workers.  As an employer, you will have the ability to hire one unit of labor (at most) in each 
decision round from a pool of workers.  You may wish to do this because a unit of labor will be 
assumed to produce a certain amount of output for you for that round.  To keep things simple, 
whatever output a unit of labor produces, we will assume that you will sell each unit of that 
output for a market price of $1 (one experimental dollar).  You will have the ability to hire a unit 
of labor in each round for a series of decision-making rounds.  In each decision round, your 
experimental earnings will be determined by your employer “profits”.  Profits are calculated as 
total revenues minus total costs.  Your employer profits in each round are then simple to 
calculate—your total revenues are given by the quantity of output that the unit of labor will 
produce for you (multiplied by the $1 that you receive for each unit of output), and your total 
costs are just given by whatever you agree to pay for the worker for his/her unit of labor.   
 
You will receive specific and more detailed instructions on labor productivity shortly. 
 
 You  are  not required to purchase a unit of labor in each round.  Rather, if you do not 
purchase a unit of labor in a given round, your profits for that round are zero (since total revenue 
and total cost are zero).  If you do hire a unit of labor in a given round, your profits for that round 
will depend on both the productivity of labor (i.e., how much output the unit of labor produces 
for you) and the wage that you pay for that unit of labor.  For example, if a worker produces 
three units of output for you, and if you agree to pay that worker $2, then your profits for that 
decision round would be $1 (remember, three units of output are assumed to be sold by you for 
$1 each, and so total revenues are $3).  If, on the other hand, you agree to pay that worker $4, 
then your profits for that round would be $-1.  In other words, one dollar would be subtracted 
from you total experimental earnings in that case.  As such, your experimental earnings would be 
higher if you did not hire a unit of labor in a given round, as opposed to hiring a unit of labor and 
earning negative profits.  The way in which you earn money in this experiment (through 
your profits) is private information to you and should not be discussed with other 
employers or with the workers.   
  In this experiment, there are a total of 5 employers and 10 workers.  Each worker in the 
experiment has the ability to sell one unit of his labor to only one employer in each decision 
round, and each employer can hire only one unit of labor per decision round.  As an employer, 
you be allowed to freely “shop” around within the pool of workers in your attempt to hire one 
unit of labor for the round.  Similarly, each worker will be allowed to freely shop among the 
employers in order to sell his/her unit of labor.  Each round will last for a maximum of 2.5 
minutes.  The wages you and a worker mutually agree to and your per-round experimental profits 
will be calculated on the Decision Sheet that you have also been given.  If you and a worker 
agree on a wage for given round, the Decision sheet also includes a space for you to document 
the identification number of the worker you purchased your unit of labor from for that round. 
 
FOR TODAY’S EXPERIMENT, YOUR CASH EARNING ARE RELATED TO YOUR 
EXPERIMENTAL EARNINGS BY THE FOLLOWING EXCHANGE RATE: 
 





Specific (Treatment) Instructions for _____EMPLOYER 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
TREATMENT 1 
For the next few rounds, each of the workers in the worker pool will be equally 
productive, and a unit of labor from any worker will produce 3 units of output.  As such, if you 
mutually agree with any worker on hiring his/her unit of labor in a particular round, you know 
that the productivity of the worker will be 3 units of output. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
TREATMENT 2-4 (combined for exposition only) 
For the next few rounds, different workers may have different productivities, and you 
will not know the productivity of any given worker until after you have hired a unit of labor 
from that worker.  You will, however, be given some general information on the entire group of 
workers. 
  The pool of workers for the following rounds has these characteristics (productivity refers 
to how many units of output a worker’s unit of labor will produce for you): 
 
10% chance that a worker has productivity of 1 
    10% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      60% chance that a worker has productivity of 3 
      10% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
10% chance that a worker has productivity of 5 
 
20% chance that a worker has productivity of 1 
    20% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      20% chance that a worker has productivity of 3 
      20% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
20% chance that a worker has productivity of 5 
 
50% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      50% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
 
Neither you nor the workers know exactly how productive a worker will be until after the 
unit of labor is hired.  You may seek to mutually agree upon a wage with any worker, but you 
will not know his/her productivity until after you have made your wage agreement with the 
worker.  The workers do not know how productive their labor will be for an employer 
either.  Workers see the same general worker characteristics that you see above.   
Once the round is over, for all employers who hired a unit of labor, a random draw will 
be made from a Bingo Cage to determine the productivity of the unit of labor.  A separate draw 
will be made for each employer.  Profits for each employer can then be calculated using the 
random draw of productivity to determine the total revenue that is generated by that unit of 
output.  Your total costs are still just the agreed-upon wage for the unit of labor that you hired.   
  Finally, it is important for you to realize that each new round under this set of instructions 
will be conducted similarly.  You may have made a wage agreement with a particular individual 
in a previous round which resulted in a productivity of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.  However, that does not 
affect in any way the probabilities for productivity for a future round, even if you re-hire the 
same person.  In other words, if you make an agreement with Jane Doe in round one, and the 
random productivity draw says that the productivity for that unit of labor is 3, that does not 
imply that you can make an agreement with the same Jane Doe in the next round and be 
Treatment 2 
Treatment 3 




guaranteed a productivity of 3.  The productivity that Jane Doe’s unit of labor provides for you 
or any other employer in any round will always be determined by a new draw from the Bingo 
Cage.  Each round should be treated as independent from any other round in terms of 
determining worker productivity after agreements have been made—even though the pool of 
workers is still physically composed of the same individuals.  Please raise your hand if this is 
confusing in any way! 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All Treatments 
Each decision round is 2.5 minutes long, and the experiment will continue in this fashion 
until you are given different instructions.  If you and a worker agree on a wage for given round, 
the Decision sheet also includes a space for you to document the identification number of the 
worker you purchased your unit of labor from for that round. 
  Your decision sheet for these rounds is attached to these instructions.  Please raise your 
hand if at any point your have questions about how each round will proceed and/or how to 
correctly fill out your decision sheet. 
 
Decision Sheet for ____ 
 























times output price, 



































  This is an experiment in economic decision-making.  Please read and follow the 
instructions carefully.  Your decisions as well as the decisions of others will help determine your 
total cash payment for participation in this experiment. 
  In this experiment, you are a Worker.  Other individuals in the experiment will be 
employers.  As a worker, you will have the ability to sell one unit of labor (at most) in each 
decision round to only one employer.  You may wish to do this because selling a unit of labor 
will provide you with a wage for that round.  You will have the ability to sell a unit of labor in 
each round for a series of decision-making rounds.  In each decision round, your experimental 
earnings will be determined by the wage you can obtain from selling your unit of labor.  
Employers may be interested in paying you a wage for your unit of labor because your labor 
produces output for the employer, which we will assume the employer can sell for profit.   
 
You will receive specific and more detailed instructions on labor productivity shortly. 
 
 You  are  not required to sell a unit of labor in each round.  Rather, if you do not sell a unit 
of labor in a given round, you will still earn a minimal $.40 for that round.  If you do sell your 
one unit of labor in a given round, then your experimental earnings for that round will be the 
wage you mutually agree upon with the employer.  For example, if you agree with an employer 
to sell your unit of labor for $1.00, then your earnings for that round would be $1.00 (one 
experimental dollar).  If you agree with an employer to sell your labor for $.25, then your earning 
for that round would be $.25.  If you do not sell your unit of labor to any employer, then your 
earnings for that round are $.40.  As such, your experimental earnings would be higher if you did 
not sell your unit of labor in a given round, as opposed to selling it for less than $.40.  The way 
in which you earn money in this experiment (through wages) is private information to you 
and should not be discussed with other workers or with the employers 
 
  In this experiment, there are a total of 5 employers and 10 workers.  Each worker in the 
experiment has the ability to sell one unit of his labor to only one employer in each decision 
round, and each employer can hire only one unit of labor per decision round.  As a worker, you 
be allowed to freely “shop” around among the employers in your attempt to sell one unit of labor 
for the round.  Similarly, each employer will be allowed to freely shop among the pool of 
workers in order to hire his/her unit of labor.  Each round will last for a maximum of 2.5 
minutes.  The wages you and an employer mutually agree to and your per-round experimental 
profits will be calculated on the Decision Sheet that you have also been given.  If you and an 
employer agree upon a wage for given round, the Decision sheet also includes a space for you to 





FOR TODAY’S EXPERIMENT, YOUR CASH EARNING ARE RELATED TO YOUR 
EXPERIMENTAL EARNINGS BY THE FOLLOWING EXCHANGE RATE: 
 




Specific (Treatment) Instructions for ____WORKER 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TREATMENT 1 
For the next few rounds, each of the workers in the worker pool will be equally 
productive, and a unit of labor from any worker will produce 3 units of output.  As such, if you 
mutually agree with any employer on selling your unit of labor in a particular round, the 
employer will know that the productivity of your unit of labor will be 3 units of output. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TREATMENT 2-4 (combined for exposition only) 
  For the next few rounds, different workers may have different productivities, and 
employers will not know the productivity of any given worker until after the employer has hired 
(and you have sold) the unit of labor.  As a worker, you will not know either what your own 
productivity will be for that employer until after your labor unit is sold.  You will, however, be 
given some general information on the entire group of workers.  The employers are given this 
general information as well, and productivity refers to how many units of output a worker will 
produce for the employer who purchases his/her unit of labor. 
 
  The pool of workers for the following rounds has these characteristics: 
 
10% chance that a worker has productivity of 1 
    10% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      60% chance that a worker has productivity of 3 
      10% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
10% chance that a worker has productivity of 5 
 
20% chance that a worker has productivity of 1 
    20% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      20% chance that a worker has productivity of 3 
      20% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
20% chance that a worker has productivity of 5 
 
50% chance that a worker has productivity of 2 
      50% chance that a worker has productivity of 4 
 
Neither you nor the employers know exactly how productive a worker will be until after 
the unit of labor is hired.  You may seek to mutually agree upon a wage with any employer, but 
the employer will not know your productivity for that round until after you have made your wage 
agreement with the employer. 
Once the round is over, for all employers who hired a unit of labor, a random draw will 
be made from a Bingo Cage to determine the productivity of the unit of labor (for the purposes of 
the employer’s calculation of profits).  A separate draw will be made for each employer.  As a 
worker, your experimental earnings for each round are still determined by the wage agreed upon 
with the employer (or $.40 in a round when you do not sell your unit of labor to any employer). 
  Finally, it is important for you to realize that each new round under this set of instructions 
will be conducted similarly.  An employer may have made a wage agreement with you in a 
previous round which resulted in a productivity of 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.  However, that does not affect 
in any way the probabilities for your productivity for a future round.  In other words, if you make 
an agreement with an employer in round one, and the random productivity draw says that the 
productivity for your unit of labor is 3, that does not imply that your productivity is guaranteed 
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to be 3 in the next round.  The productivity that your unit of labor provides to any employer 
(even then same one) in any round will always be determined by a new draw from the Bingo 
Cage.  Each round should be treated as independent from any other round in terms of 
determining worker productivity after agreements have been made—even though the pool of 
workers is still physically made of the same individuals.  Please raise your hand if this is 
confusing in any way! 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
All Treatments 
Each decision round is 2.5 minutes long, and the experiment will continue in this fashion 
until you are given different instructions.  If you and an employer agree upon a wage for given 
round, the Decision sheet also includes a space for you to document the identification number 
of the employer you sold your unit of labor to for that round. 
  Your decision sheet for these rounds is attached to these instructions.  Please raise your 
hand if at any point your have questions about how each round will proceed and/or how to 
correctly fill out your decision sheet. 
 
Decision Sheet for ____ 
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           TOTAL PROFITS FOR THIS DECISION SHEET______________ 
 
 